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THE FLSA PERMISSION SLIP:  
DETERMINING WHETHER FLSA SETTLEMENTS 
AND VOLUNTARY DISMISSALS 
REQUIRE APPROVAL 
Alex Lau* 
 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) seeks to protect the poorest, 
most vulnerable workers by requiring that they be paid a minimum wage and 
compensated for their overtime labor.  When employers do not pay their 
workers minimum wage or overtime compensation and thereby violate the 
FLSA, workers have the power to sue their employers for remuneration.  Like 
many other types of cases, most FLSA cases settle before going to trial.  
Unlike those other types of cases, however, most courts have held that 
settlements of FLSA cases must be approved to be enforceable.  Even though 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 generally allows parties to settle lawsuits 
by voluntarily dismissing their lawsuits without approval, these courts have 
held that the FLSA should be an exception to Rule 41.  Some courts, however, 
have held that settlements of FLSA cases should not require approval to be 
enforceable. 
This Note addresses and analyzes the differences between these 
approaches.  It seeks to balance the protection the FLSA intends to provide 
workers and the ability of parties to freely settle disputes embodied in Rule 
41.  To strike this balance, this Note suggests that settlements of lawsuits 
brought under the FLSA should not require approval, because the Act should 
be subject to and not exempt from Rule 41.  However, settlements of causes 
of action arising under the FLSA should require approval to ensure the 
necessary protection the Act was meant to provide to the workers it serves. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Department of Labor (DOL) investigation leads to a finding that a 
grocery store has violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and owes its 
employees more than $10,000 in back wages.1  After the employer is 
unsuccessful in negotiating a settlement with the DOL, it works to settle 
quickly and inexpensively with its employees.2  The employer goes to the 
employees directly and offers them $1000 to be split among those who agree 
to settle the claims.3  The employer and its representative imply that the 
employees are not entitled to the money they would get from the settlement, 
tell them that they do not deserve the money, and fight back against concerns 
from employees about their pay.4  Fourteen employees sign the agreement.5  
Some of these employees do not speak English and none of them consult an 
attorney or seem to know about the DOL’s finding.6  The employer then 
brings a declaratory judgment action to have the settlement judicially 
approved.7  This Note explores whether such settlements must be supervised 
or approved by a court or the DOL. 
The grocery store workers described above represent the type of workers 
the FLSA seeks to protect:  vulnerable, impoverished, and uninformed.  Some 
of these workers are afraid to bring lawsuits or go to trial for fear of retaliation 
at work, or worse, losing their jobs.8  For all of those risks, there is not much 
reward.  Many FLSA cases are not worth enough for individual plaintiffs to 
go to trial, and they end up settling for meager amounts.9 
 
 1. See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. at 1354–55. 
 5. See id. at 1352. 
 6. See id. at 1354. 
 7. See id. at 1351–52. 
 8. Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage Law 
Enforcement in the Federal Courts, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269, 296–97 (2008); 
Janice Harper, What to Expect If You Sue Your Employer, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janice-harper/what-to-expect-when-you-s_b_1194955.html 
[https://perma.cc/BBL3-4C9P]. 
 9. See Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013).  Since 2007, the mean settlement value per plaintiff in FLSA cases has been $5472, 
while the median settlement value per plaintiff during that time is even lower, at just $2576. 
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Because many employees are afraid to bring lawsuits, and those who do 
are incentivized to settle, there is little reason for employers who violate the 
FLSA to discontinue their unlawful practices.  On the off chance they get 
caught, they will likely be able to settle for a small amount.  Further, 
settlement agreements of FLSA claims often include confidentiality 
provisions and require employees to agree to waive any other existing claims 
they may have against the employer.10  Confidentiality provisions stymie 
additional claims by keeping workers from learning about suits.  The waiver 
of claims prevents workers who bring suit from bringing other possibly 
legitimate claims against their employers.  These types of provisions in 
settlement agreements allow employers to continue to take advantage of their 
workers. 
The concern over unfair settlements has led some courts to require 
settlements of FLSA causes of action and voluntary dismissals of FLSA 
lawsuits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 to be approved by a court 
or the DOL.11  The rationale behind an approval requirement is that it keeps 
predatory employers from taking advantage of vulnerable employees in 
unfair settlement agreements.12  Approval requirements not only ensure that 
individual workers are not taken advantage of, but also that workers as a 
whole are protected.13  Such requirements thereby bolster the threat and 
consequences for those employers that do violate the FLSA.14  They also give 
employees extra bargaining power in a relationship where their power is 
usually lacking.15 
Some courts have been resistant to an approval requirement.  They reason 
that private settlements should be respected.16  They hold that an approval 
requirement is not practical because most FLSA cases are not worth enough 
for either party to take further action if a settlement is not approved.17  These 
courts recognize the balancing act between protecting workers as a whole and 
protecting individual employee-plaintiffs who may not have the resources to 
 
See Stephanie Plancich, Neil Fanaroff & Janeen McIntosh, Trends in Wage and Hour 
Settlements:  2015 Update, NERA ECON. CONSULTING 7 (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015/PUB_Wage_and_Hour_Settlemen
ts_0715.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y8H-25UA]. 
 10. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing 
Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, No. 14-cv-1274, 2015 WL 1455689, at *1–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
30, 2015)). 
 11. See, e.g., id.; Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1352–53, 1355. 
 12. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 203 (citing Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1352). 
 13. Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent Workers, Disappearing Rights:  Confidential Settlements 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 109, 133–34 (2013) (stating 
that even though the court’s first consideration in approving FLSA settlements should be 
whether the settlement is fair to the employee-plaintiff, the court also needs to consider 
whether such a settlement would help keep similar situations from happening to other 
workers). 
 14. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 207. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012); Martinez v. 
Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631 (W.D. Tex. 2005). 
 17. See Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
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continue to litigate if their settlement agreements are not approved.  Even 
though an approval requirement may help to ensure the overall protection of 
vulnerable workers from unscrupulous employers, that may be of little 
assurance to the non-English-speaking grocery store employee whose case is 
not worth much and who needs money.18 
This Note will discuss whether settlements of FLSA causes of action and 
lawsuits should have to be approved by a court or the DOL to be enforceable.  
This Note uses the term “cause(s) of action” to refer to facts that would enable 
a person to bring a lawsuit, while the terms “lawsuit(s)” and “action(s)” refer 
to an actual lawsuit that has been initiated based on a cause of action. 
Part I provides an overview of the statutes and rules involved in the issue 
of requiring approval of FLSA settlements.  Part I.A discusses the FLSA, its 
legislative history, amendments, and relevant case law interpretations.  Part 
I.B discusses Rule 41, which governs voluntary dismissals in federal 
lawsuits.  This part analyzes Rule 41’s history and discusses the statutes and 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that are exceptions to Rule 41.  Part I.C 
discusses other relevant federal employment statutes, such as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),19 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),20 and the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA).21  This Part discusses whether settlements and voluntary dismissals 
under these acts should be treated differently from those under the FLSA. 
Part II discusses how courts have analyzed whether private settlements of 
FLSA causes of action and voluntary dismissals of FLSA lawsuits should 
require court or DOL approval to be enforceable.  Parts II.A and II.B analyze 
the circuit split between the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits over whether private 
settlements of FLSA claims must be approved by a court or the DOL to be 
enforceable.  Parts II.C and II.D discuss a Second Circuit case and an Eastern 
District of New York case that differ over whether voluntary dismissals of 
FLSA lawsuits must be approved by a court or the DOL to be enforceable. 
Part III argues that private settlements of FLSA causes of action should 
require DOL or court approval to be enforceable but that settlements and 
voluntary dismissals of FLSA lawsuits should not require DOL or court 
approval to be enforceable.  Part III.A discusses how the Second Circuit-
Eastern District of New York discrepancy mirrors the Eleventh Circuit-Fifth 
Circuit split.  Part III.B discusses why the FLSA is not an applicable federal 
statute under Rule 41.  Part III.C explains why parties should be able to 
voluntarily dismiss and settle lawsuits brought under the FLSA without court 
or DOL approval if those dismissals and settlements are made knowingly and 
voluntarily and are of a bona fide dispute.  Part III.D suggests that parties 
should not be able to do the same for causes of action arising under the FLSA.  
Finally, Part III.E proposes an amendment to the FLSA that Congress should 
adopt to implement these changes. 
 
 18. See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 
1982). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
 20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). 
 21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012). 
232 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
I.  WHY THE PERMISSION SLIP SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE SIGNED:  
AN OVERVIEW OF THE FLSA, RULE 41, 
AND OTHER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT STATUTES 
Whether settlements of FLSA causes of action and voluntary dismissals of 
FLSA lawsuits should require court or DOL approval implicates both the 
FLSA and Rule 41.  To understand this issue, it is important to understand 
the reasons these rules were created, what they sought to accomplish, and 
how the understanding of them has developed over time.  Part I.A provides 
this information about the FLSA, while Part I.B provides this information 
about Rule 41.  To put this Note into context, Part I.C compares the FLSA to 
other federal employment statutes.  This analysis focuses on how the 
similarities and differences among these statutes are reflected in their 
respective treatment of private settlements of causes of action and lawsuits. 
A.  The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
Part I.A.1 discusses the FLSA’s intended purpose.  Then, Part I.A.2 
outlines the FLSA’s enforcement provisions, including how claims can be 
brought and the penalties imposed for violating the FLSA.  Next, Part I.A.3 
explains the FLSA’s lack of guidance regarding how FLSA claims can be 
settled and analyzes how Congress and the courts have approached FLSA 
settlements. 
1.  A Uniquely Protective Statute:  The FLSA’s Enactment 
The FLSA was first introduced on the Senate floor on May 24, 1937.22  It 
was passed in response to a finding “of labor conditions detrimental to the 
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, 
efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”23  Its goal was “to correct and 
as rapidly as practicable to eliminate [these conditions].”24 
To accomplish this goal, Congress established a national minimum wage25 
and provided for overtime compensation.26  From the time the FLSA was 
introduced on the Senate floor to the day it was passed, much of President 
 
 22. S. 2475, 75th Cong. (1937). 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012). 
 24. Id. § 202(b).  While the FLSA mentioned improving commerce as one of its goals in 
addition to improving labor conditions, it was included mostly to ensure that the Act would be 
allowed under the then-hotly debated Commerce Clause. See id. § 202.  The Commerce Clause 
gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Drafters of New Deal 
legislation saw the Commerce Clause as the best route for passing their legislation and, as a 
result, often made overt references to commerceas they did with the FLSAin an attempt 
to cover their legislation under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1282 (2012) (citing 
commerce as a reason to pass the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which was passed in 1933); 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (citing commerce as a reason to pass the National Labor Relations 
Act, which was passed in 1935). 
 25. 29 U.S.C. § 206. 
 26. Id. § 207. 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt’s discussion of it27as well as Congress’s28focused 
on providing much-needed protection for the lowest class of workers.  The 
Act sought to prevent employers from undercutting each other’s wages in a 
“race to the bottom” that increased the number of impoverished workers and 
decreased the already low standard of living among the working class.29  
Without minimum wages and overtime compensation, employers would 
continue to make their employees work longer hours in worse conditions for 
less money.30 
2.  Enforcement of the FLSA 
Claims regarding violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime 
provisions can be enforced under the FLSA in three ways:  (1) employees31 
can bring private lawsuits against their employers,32 (2) the Secretary of 
Labor can bring lawsuits on behalf of employees against their employers,33 
or (3) the Secretary of Labor can supervise the payment of back wages owed 
to employees from employers.34 
Originally, the only way to enforce the FLSA was through the first option; 
the second and third options were added to the Act as part of the Fair Labor 
Standards Amendments of 1949.35  They were added to provide alternatives 
 
 27. See H.R. DOC. NO. 75-458, at 2–3, 8 (1938); H.R. DOC. NO. 75-255 (1937); FRANKLIN 
D. ROOSEVELT, Fireside Chat, in 1938 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 391, 391–92 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941). 
 28. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-1452, at 8 (1937) (“[I]t is plain that this administration is 
privileged to give relief to that large majority who constitute one-third of our population, 
referred to by [President Roosevelt] as ‘ill-nourished, ill-clad, and ill-housed.’” (quoting H.R. 
DOC. NO. 75-255, at 1)); S. REP. NO. 75-884, at 3–4 (1937) (“It is only those low-wage and 
long-working-hour industrial workers, who are the helpless victims of their own bargaining 
weakness, that this bill seeks to assist to obtain a minimum wage.”). 
 29. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 112–13 (quoting ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T 
LAW PROJECT, BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:  VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND 
LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 6 (2009), https://nelp.3cdn.net/e470538bfa5a7e7a46 
_2um6br7o3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4987-6LMA]). 
 30. See id. 
 31. The FLSA applies to employees who are “engaged in commerce or in the production 
of goods for commerce, or [are] employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1).  “Commerce” is defined 
broadly as “trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the 
several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.” Id. § 203(b).  “[E]ngaged 
in the production of goods” is defined as “producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, 
transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in any closely related process 
or occupation directly essential to the production thereof, in any State.” Id. § 203(j).  
“Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” is defined as 
an enterprise with employees engaging in such activities or “handling, selling, or otherwise 
working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce” and 
“whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000.” Id. 
§ 203(s)(1)(A). 
 32. Id. § 216(b). 
 33. Id. § 216(c). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, ch. 736, 63 Stat. 910, 
919 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)). 
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to private lawsuits that could benefit both employees and employers.36  The 
Secretary of Labor bringing a lawsuit or supervising payment benefits 
employees because employers will be more responsive to the DOL than they 
will be to employees.  Thus, if the DOL pursues wages owed to employees 
under the FLSA, employers will be more likely to pay than if employees 
bring claims themselves.37  These options also protect employers because 
once the Secretary of Labor files a complaint to initiate a lawsuit or the 
employee accepts wages under a DOL-supervised payment, the employee 
forfeits his right to bring his own lawsuit for the same wages or to privately 
receive such wages.38  This stamp of approval from the Secretary of Labor 
reassures employers that they will be protected against subsequent private 
lawsuits.39  No such supervision provision exists in the FLSA for settlements 
of private lawsuits.40 
If an employer is found liable under the FLSA, he will owe the aggrieved 
employee any unpaid wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount 
of liquidated damages.41  In addition, the employer must pay attorney’s fees 
and costs incurred by the employee in bringing the suit.42 
Section 216(b) of the FLSA gives employees the power to bring collective 
actions.43  Collective actions involve employees bringing lawsuits against 
their employers on behalf of themselves “and other employees similarly 
situated.”44 
Collective actions differ from the more well-known Rule 23 class actions, 
which are discussed later in this Note.45  An important difference between 
the two is that in collective actions, plaintiffs have to opt in to the lawsuit if 
 
 36. See H.R. REP. NO. 81-267, at 32 (1949) (“The underpaid employee may choose 
between action by the Secretary for simply the amount which is owed to him and an individual 
action brought under [29 U.S.C. § 216(b)] . . . .”). 
 37. See id. at 14. 
 38. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). 
 39. See S. REP. NO. 81-640, at 8 (1949); H.R. REP. NO. 81-267, at 31–32. 
 40. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 41. Id. § 216(b)–(c). 
 42. Id. § 216(b). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  Collective actions make up about 25 to 40 percent of FLSA lawsuits. See Allison 
Frankel, Wells Fargo, U.S. Chamber Fail to Rewrite Wage-and-Hour Case Rules, REUTERS 
(Mar. 15, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/03/15/wells-fargo-u-s-chamber-
fail-to-rewrite-wage-and-hour-case-rules/ [https://perma.cc/9HYR-RMXG] (noting that 2500 
FLSA collective actions were filed in 2011); XMPT Survey Report, LITTLER 2 (Oct. 2013), 
https://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/2013-Littler-Mendelson-Xmpt-Survey-Report-
October-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXY6-A3Y9] (noting that 2507 FLSA collective actions 
were filed in 2012); see also Richard L. Alfred, FLSA Suits Continue to Skyrocket:  New 
Record High in 2015, More Than 9,000 Expected in 2016, SEYFARTH SHAW (Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://www.seyfarth.com/news/FLSA-Suits-Skyrocket [https://perma.cc/BPG7-C3Y5] 
(noting that 8152 FLSA lawsuits were filed in total in 2012 and 6335 FLSA lawsuits were 
filed in total in 2011); Teresa S. Valderrama, FLSA Claims and Collective Actions:  How to 
Avoid Claims and Defend Them, ASS’N CORP. COUNSEL 3 (Feb. 12, 2008), 
http://www.acc.com/chapters/houst/upload/20080212CA.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFX9-
Q2BW] (noting that of the 3000 FLSA lawsuits filed in 2004, close to 800 of them were 
collective actions). 
 45. See infra Part I.B. 
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they want to be part of it.46  In class actions, however, plaintiffs are 
automatically involved in the lawsuit and have to opt out if they do not want 
to be part of it.47  As a result, there are usually more plaintiffs in class actions 
than in collective actions.48  This can lead to a principal-agent dynamic in 
class actions, in which the lead plaintiffs represent a much larger group of 
plaintiffs, most of whom are not engaged in the lawsuit.49  Plaintiffs in FLSA 
collective actions, however, are part of the lawsuit because they want to be, 
not because they do not care enough to leave it.50  Thus, the principal-agent 
dynamic prevalent in class actions is not a concern in collective actions. 
3.  A Question Left Unanswered:  
How to Deal with FLSA Settlements 
Early U.S. Supreme Court cases held that employees could not settle for 
less than what they were owed under the FLSA nor waive their right to 
liquidated damages without a bona fide dispute between the parties over the 
number of hours worked or compensation owed.51  In these cases, the Court 
reasoned that allowing workers to settle for less than what they were owed 
under the law would be a violation of the FLSA.  If there was no dispute over 
the amount owed to the employee or the number of hours worked by the 
employee, then the employer should have to pay the employee the amount 
the FLSA calls for.52  The Court also focused on the FLSA’s protection of 
the lowest class of workers.53  Allowing these workers to settle for less than 
what they were owed under the FLSA would be antithetical to the Act’s 
purpose—to ensure a minimum wage and standard of living for all.54  
 
 46. See Daniel C. Lopez, Collective Confusion:  FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class 
Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 277–78 (2009). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Brunsden, supra note 8, at 292–94. 
 49. Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ryan, The Second-Class Class Action:  How Courts Thwart 
Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 531–32 (2012). 
 50. Id. at 527, 555–58; see also Brunsden, supra note 8, at 296–301.  Congress 
deliberately provided for collective actions to avoid class action situations in which small 
groups of representatives would bring lawsuits on behalf of a larger group of unengaged 
employees. See Brunsden, supra note 8, at 280 n.59 (citing 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947) 
(statement of Sen. Forrest C. Donnell)).  
 51. See D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 116 (1946); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. 
O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945). 
 52. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116 (noting that a compromise of a dispute not having to do 
with the compensation owed or number of hours worked “thwarts the public policy . . . 
embodied in the [FLSA] by reducing the sum selected by Congress as proper compensation 
for withholding wages”); O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 707 (“No one can doubt but that to allow waiver 
of statutory wages by agreement would nullify the purposes of the [FLSA].”). 
 53. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116; O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 706. 
 54. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116 (stating that “the purpose of the [FLSA], which we repeat 
from the O’Neil case was to secure for the lowest paid segment of the Nation’s workers a 
subsistence wage, leads to the conclusion that neither wages nor the damages for withholding 
them are capable of reduction by” compromise of a dispute not having to do with the 
compensation owed or number of hours worked); O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 706 (“The [FLSA] was 
a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and 
employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to 
prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national health and efficiency . . . .”). 
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Further, the Court focused on the quasi-public55 rights conferred by the 
FLSA.56  Individuals that bring lawsuits under the FLSA serve as private 
attorneys general.57  Such lawsuits not only benefit and achieve justice for 
these individuals, but ensure the fair competition and wages necessary to 
maintain a minimum standard of living for all workers.58  The Court reasoned 
that because a quasi-public right “may not be waived or released if such 
waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy,” employees could not 
waive their right to what they were owed under the FLSA.59 
The Court held that employees could not waive their FLSA rights or settle 
a case if there was not a bona fide dispute over the number of hours worked 
or compensation owed.  However, it left open the question of whether parties 
could settle FLSA claims where such a dispute did exist.60  The Portal-to-
Portal Pay Act of 194761 (the “1947 Act”) sought to answer this question. 
The 1947 Act allowed FLSA claims to be privately settled where a bona 
fide dispute existed over what was owed to the employee.62  Both lawsuits 
and causes of action could be settled.63  The 1947 Act pushed back against64 
early Supreme Court cases65 by allowing liquidated damages to be waived 
even where a bona fide dispute did not exist.66  Settlements of FLSA claims 
or waivers of liquidated damages did not have to be approved.67  But the 1947 
Act only allowed FLSA claims to be settled and liquidated damages to be 
waived if such claims and damages were based on FLSA violations that 
occurred before the 1947 Act’s passage.68 
This retrospective application was the result of a practical compromise by 
Congress.  It realized it needed to take drastic measures to deal with a flood 
of FLSA litigation that resulted from early Supreme Court cases.69  However, 
 
 55. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 112–16 (discussing and defining “quasi-public” rights). 
 56. O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 704 (defining a right conferred by the FLSA as “a statutory right 
conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest”). 
 57. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 115–16. 
 58. Id. 
 59. O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 704. 
 60. See D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1946) (concluding that it is 
unnecessary “to consider here the possibility of compromises in other situations which may 
arise, such as a dispute over the number of hours worked or the regular rate of employment”). 
 61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262 (2012). 
 62. Id. § 253(a). 
 63. Id. (“Any cause of action under the [FLSA] . . . or any action . . . to enforce such a 
cause of action, may hereafter be compromised in whole or in part . . . .”). 
 64. See id. § 251; Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 623 (W.D. 
Tex. 2005); Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, and for Other Purposes:  
Hearings on H.R. 584 and H.J. Res. 91 Before the Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 80th Cong. 301 (1947) (statement of Robert B. Beach, Vice President and Executive 
Secretary, National Association of Building Owners and Managers); 52 CONG. REC. 2250, 
2254 (1947); 52 CONG. REC. 1543, 1555 (1947). 
 65. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 66. 29 U.S.C. § 253(b). 
 67. Id. § 253. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. § 251(a) (“The Congress finds that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as 
amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], has been interpreted judicially in disregard of long-
established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby 
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Congress worried that by applying the 1947 Act to future FLSA claims, the 
FLSA would effectively be gutted as employers likely would be able to settle 
causes of action and lawsuits for less than what the FLSA required of them.70  
Thus, the 1947 Act was essentially a Band-Aid for preexisting FLSA claims.  
With its retrospective application, the 1947 Act did not provide any guidance 
about whether future claims or lawsuits based on FLSA violations that 
occurred after its passage could be settled privately without approval.71 
B.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 
Part I.B.1 introduces the relevant provisions of Rule 41 and the voluntary 
dismissal of lawsuits.  Then, Part I.B.2 discusses the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and federal statutes that are exempt from Rule 41, such that 
lawsuits brought under these rules and statutes cannot be voluntarily 
dismissed.  Finally, Part I.B.3 explains the reasons those rules and statutes 
are exempt from Rule 41. 
1.  Voluntary Dismissals 
There is a longstanding public policy favoring private settlements of 
disputes.72  This policy is embodied in Rule 41, which allows voluntary 
dismissals of lawsuits.73  Lawsuits can be dismissed voluntarily either by 
plaintiffs74 or court order.75  One way plaintiffs can dismiss a lawsuit without 
a court order is by filing “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party 
serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”76  The other 
way is by filing “a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have 
appeared.”77  The latter option is the subject of this Note.78  Unless the 
 
creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon 
employers . . . .” (first alteration in original)). 
 70. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door:  The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act 
of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 156 (1991) (stating that had the 1947 Act applied to FLSA 
violations before and after the 1947 Act’s passage, the “FLSA would have been virtually 
repealed” and “[v]iolations of [the] FLSA would then have been reduced to something akin to 
common-law breaches of contract”).  
 71. See H.R. REP. NO. 80-326, at 12 (1947) (Conf. Rep.) (“It will be noted that [29 U.S.C. 
§ 253] lays down no rule as to compromises or waivers with respect to causes of action 
hereafter accruing.”). 
 72. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36 (1996). 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a). 
 74. Id. 41(a)(1). 
 75. Id. 41(a)(2). 
 76. Id. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 77. Id. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).  A “stipulation” is “[a] voluntary agreement between opposing 
parties concerning some relevant point.” Stipulation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014).  “Appearance” is defined as “[a] coming into court as a party or interested person, or 
as a lawyer on behalf of a party or interested person.” Appearance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
 78. “Stipulation of dismissal” is essentially another term for “settlement.” See generally 
Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015) (using the term 
“settlement” interchangeably with “stipulated dismissal”). 
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stipulation of dismissal says otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice.79  
When a case is dismissed without prejudice, “the plaintiff may refile the same 
suit on the same claim” following dismissal.80  A stipulation of dismissal can 
be made with prejudice if so specified.81  When a case is dismissed with 
prejudice, “the plaintiff is foreclosed from filing a suit again on the same 
claim or claims” following dismissal.82 
Not all plaintiffs have the ability to voluntarily dismiss cases; Rule 41 is 
“[s]ubject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable federal 
statute.”83  These rules and statutes all contain language that explicitly 
requires court approval of dismissals or settlements.84 
2.  Which Rules and Statutes Require 
Court Approval of Dismissals? 
Lawsuits brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23, 23.1, 
23.2, and 66 cannot be dismissed without court approval.  Rule 23 relates to 
class actions.85  Class actions are lawsuits in which one or more members of 
a class represent all members of a class in a lawsuit in which they are suing 
or being sued.86  Rule 23.1 relates to derivative actions.87  Derivative actions 
are lawsuits in which shareholders or members of a corporation or 
unincorporated association sue a third party on behalf of the corporation or 
association.88  Rule 23.2 applies to actions relating to unincorporated 
associations.89  These actions are “brought by or against the members of an 
unincorporated association as a class by naming certain members as 
representative parties.”90  Until 1966, actions brought under Rules 23.1 and 
23.2 were housed under Rule 23.91  Rule 66 relates to actions in which 
 
 79. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B). 
 80. Dismissed Without Prejudice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B). 
 82. Dismissed with prejudice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 83. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A). 
 84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012) (“No suit or proceeding for a violation of any of the 
provisions of this subchapter shall be settled, compromised, or discontinued without the 
consent of the court in which it is pending and any such settlement, compromise, or 
discontinuance shall be entered of record with the reasons therefor.”); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) 
(2012) (“The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written 
consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, 
issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised 
only with the court’s approval.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c) (“A derivative action may be settled, 
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.2 
(“[T]he procedure for settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise must correspond with 
the procedure in Rule 23(e).”); FED. R. CIV. P. 66 (“An action in which a receiver has been 
appointed may be dismissed only by court order.”). 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 86. Id. 23(a). 
 87. Id. 23.1. 
 88. Id. 23.1(a). 
 89. Id. 23.2. 
 90. Id.  An unincorporated association is an “organization that is not a legal entity separate 
from the persons who compose it.” Association, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.2 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
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receivers are appointed, bring suit, or are sued.92  A receiver is a disinterested 
person that is appointed by the court to protect or collect disputed property.93 
Rule 41 mentions these specific Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before 
vaguely referring to “any applicable federal statute.”94  While Rule 41’s text 
does not clarify what “applicable federal statute” means, the rule drafters’ 
note to Rule 41 provides examples of such statutes.95  It notes that 
“[p]rovisions regarding dismissal in such statutes as” 8 U.S.C. § 1329 and 31 
U.S.C. § 3730 would not be affected by Rule 41.96  No other statutes are 
listed as examples.97  Section 1329 is a statute within the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.98  It gives district courts jurisdiction over all cases brought 
by the United States arising under the immigration subchapter of the Act.99  
Section 3730 allows private persons known as relators to bring civil lawsuits 
on behalf of the federal government against those who have defrauded the 
federal government.100  Besides these statutes and the FLSA, the only other 
statute that has been considered an applicable federal statute by a court is 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(g).  Under this statute, a federal prisoner cannot bring a civil 
action or appeal such an action if that prisoner has on three or more prior 
occasions, while imprisoned, brought a lawsuit that was dismissed for being 
frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.101 
3.  Why These Rules and Statutes Require 
Court Approval of Dismissals 
There are various reasons why lawsuits cannot be dismissed without 
approval under these rules and statutes.  Lawsuits brought under Rules 23, 
23.1, and 23.2 involve small groups that are members of, and represent the 
interests of, larger groups.102  Problems can arise when members of the large 
group disagree with how the small group acts in the course of litigation, 
especially when the small group agrees to settlements on behalf of the 
whole.103  As a result, courts must approve these settlements to ensure the 
larger group’s interests are well represented.104 
Rule 66 requires settlements to be approved by a court because receivers 
are appointed by courts and represent an extraordinary investment that a court 
should employ with the “utmost caution” and grant “only in cases of clear 
 
 92. FED. R. CIV. P. 66. 
 93. See Receiver, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 94. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A). 
 95. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012). 
 99. See id. 
 100. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012); see also id. § 3729. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012). 
 102. Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation:  Who May Challenge 
Settlements in Class Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 82–84 (1998). 
 103. Id. at 83–84. 
 104. Id. at 91–92. 
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necessity.”105  Allowing voluntary dismissal of these cases would give parties 
power to render the time and effort invested by the court worthless.106  
Further, because receivers are court appointed, voluntary dismissal of Rule 
66 cases would allow parties to unilaterally remove court officers—too great 
a power for parties to have.107 
Settlements of lawsuits brought under § 1329 require approval because of 
the duty U.S. Attorneys have to prosecute every suit brought by the United 
States under the immigration subchapter of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.108  If the case is going to be settled rather than prosecuted, the court must 
consent to the settlement given its jurisdiction over the case.109 
Settlements of lawsuits brought under § 3730 require approval to keep 
relators from reducing the government’s recovery and unjustly enriching 
themselves.110  For example, in one case, a relator bargained away the United 
States’ ability to bring further claims against the defendant.111  The relator 
did this to increase the amount the defendant would pay in the settlement, 
part of which would be paid to the relator.112  In another case, a relator, who 
brought a claim on behalf of himself and a claim on behalf of himself and the 
United States, negotiated with the defendant to lower the settlement amount 
that would be paid to him and the United States together.113  In exchange, the 
settlement amount that would be paid to him alone was increased.114  Each 
relator bargained away something that was not his and which came at little 
cost to himthe United States’ ability to later sue the defendant or the 
amount the United States would receive from the settlement of another 
claimin exchange for more money.  Without an approval requirement, 
relators would be able to get away with such manipulation. 
In cases implicating § 1915(g), some courts have held that plaintiffs cannot 
voluntarily dismiss a lawsuit merely to circumvent the “three or more prior 
occasions” bar that would prevent the plaintiff from bringing or appealing 
another civil lawsuit.115  The plaintiff is usually able to determine that a 
lawsuit will be dismissed and seek voluntary dismissal after a magistrate 
judge recommends dismissal and before a district judge actually dismisses 
the case.116  Without an approval requirement, § 1915(g) would be rendered 
 
 105. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2983 (3d ed. 2014). 
 106. Id. § 2981. 
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 66 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (“A party should 
not be permitted to oust the court and its officer without the consent of that court.”). 
 108. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012).  This type of requirement does not appear anywhere else in 
the U.S. Code. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Searcy v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United 
States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 718. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Large v. Beckham Cty. Dist. Court, 558 F. App’x 827, 828 (10th Cir. 2014); 
Ludy v. Nelson, No. 5:13-CV-353, 2014 WL 468509, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2014); see also 
supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Large, 558 F. App’x at 828; Ludy, 2014 WL 468509, at *1. 
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moot because a plaintiff could easily find ways around it through voluntary 
dismissal. 
C.  The Odd Man Out:  Comparing the FLSA’s Treatment of Settlements 
to That of Other Federal Employment Statutes 
Part I.C.1 compares the FLSA to other federal employment statutes in 
terms of their purposes and whom they seek to protect.  Next, Part I.C.2 
discusses how the FLSA and the other statutes treat settlements of claims. 
1.  Other Federal Employment Statutes 
The FLSA is a federal employment statute.  Thus, it is important to 
compare it to other federal employment statutes to get a better understanding 
of its unique aspects.  Federal employment statutes that are useful 
comparators in the approval-of-settlements context include Title VII, the 
ADEA, and the FMLA.117  Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.118  The ADEA 
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age.119  The FMLA 
requires employers to provide their employees with the ability to take unpaid, 
job-protected leave for family and medical reasons.120  Like the FLSA, each 
of these acts allows lawsuits to be brought either by aggrieved employees or 
a government body on behalf of those employees.121 
Title VII122 and the FMLA123 are generally applicable statutes; they do not 
necessarily seek to protect one specific group of people.  The ADEA and the 
FLSA, however, seek to help specific groups of workers.  The FLSA seeks 
to protect the most vulnerable, lowest paid segments of the workforce.124  
The ADEA seeks to protect older workers.125 
 
 117. See Socias v. Vornado Realty L.P., 297 F.R.D. 38, 40–41 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (comparing 
the FLSA to the ADEA and the FMLA to determine whether Rule 41 voluntary dismissals of 
FLSA lawsuits require approval); Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 
630 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (comparing the FLSA to the ADEA and Title VII to determine whether 
FLSA settlements that had not been approved by the court or the DOL should be enforceable); 
Andrew C. Kuettel, A Call to Congress to Add a “Knowing and Voluntary” Waiver Provision 
to the Fair Labor Standards Act to Enable Private Resolution of Wage Disputes, 30 A.B.A. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 409, 419–24 (2015) (comparing the FLSA to Title VII, the ADEA, and the 
FMLA to determine whether FLSA settlements that had not been approved by the court or the 
DOL should be enforceable). 
 118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 119. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012). 
 120. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012). 
 121. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(c), 2617(a)–(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). 
 122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a), (f), 2000e-2 to -3. 
 123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(2), 2611(3). 
 124. See H.R. DOC. NO. 75-255, at 1–2 (1937). 
 125. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). 
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2.  Treatment of Voluntary Dismissals and Settlements 
by Other Federal Employment Statutes 
The best way to determine whether a statute requires settlements to be 
approved is to look to its text.  The FLSA does not explicitly state that private 
settlements should be allowed without court approval.  But most courts have 
held that FLSA settlements must be approved to be enforceable.126  The 
FMLA and ADEA have been amended to explicitly allow private settlements 
without court approval.  The FMLA and regulations allow FMLA claims to 
be privately settled and waived based on retrospective, but not prospective, 
violations.127  The ADEA, as amended by the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act,128 is much stricter than the FMLA in terms of when it allows 
private settlements.  It allows workers to settle ADEA causes of action and 
lawsuits only if their settlement is “knowing and voluntary[,]” a standard 
based on a very detailed and strict set of statutory requirements.129  Title VII 
has no explicit provision regarding settlement.  However, Title VII case law 
generally supports the proposition that private settlements of Title VII claims 
are allowed without approval only if the settlement is “knowing and 
voluntary,” although “knowing and voluntary” is not defined as explicitly in 
Title VII case law as it is in the text of the ADEA.130 
The ADEA standard is most similar to the majority view that FLSA 
settlements must be approved.  This is because the ADEA’s enforcement 
mechanisms are modeled after the FLSA’s enforcement mechanisms.131  
Congress recognized that, like the population the FLSA protects, the elderly 
population the ADEA protects is vulnerable;132 the elderly can be 
manipulated or coerced into settlements and often sign settlements without 
 
 126. See infra Part II.A. 
 127. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2013). 
 128. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990). 
 129. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f).  The waiver of one’s rights in the settlement of a lawsuit is 
“knowing and voluntary” if (1) “the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and 
the employer that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by 
the average individual eligible to participate,” (2) the waiver clearly refers to ADEA rights, 
(3) the individual does not waive his prospective rights, (4) “the individual waives rights or 
claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the 
individual already is entitled,” (5) “the individual is advised in writing to consult with an 
attorney prior to executing the agreement,” and (6) the individual has a reasonable amount of 
time to consider the settlement. See id. § 626(f)(2).  The ADEA also allows employees to settle 
causes of action if such settlements meet similar requirements. See id. § 626(f)(1). 
 130. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974); see also Daniel 
P. O’Gorman, A State of Disarray:  The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard for Releasing 
Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 74 (2005) 
(“[T]he courts of appeal agree that a person can waive a Title VII claim if the person’s consent 
to the release is ‘knowing’ and ‘voluntary’ . . . .”). 
 131. See S. REP. NO. 101-79, pt. 2, at 3, 12–13 (1989). 
 132. Id. at 9 (“It is not accidental that Congress incorporated into the ADEA many of the 
protective procedures of the FLSA.  Age discrimination victims typically earn more than the 
minimum wage, [but not by much].  Moreover, once out of work, these older Americans have 
less than a 50/50 chance of ever finding new employment.  The [sic] often have little or no 
savings and may not yet be eligible for Social Security . . . .  Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
assume that many employees would be coerced by circumstances into accepting significant 
compromises.”). 
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knowing or understanding their rights or claims.133  In amending the ADEA 
to implement the knowing and voluntary standard, Congress purposefully did 
not make this standard as strict as the FLSA standard.  Instead, Congress 
decided to allow private, unapproved settlements of ADEA claims in certain 
circumstances, despite its understanding that such settlements are disallowed 
by most courts under the FLSA.134   
The main reason for this distinction is the difference in the types of facts 
involved in cases brought under these acts.  Suits under the ADEA generally 
involve complex, nuanced issues of fact, such as whether there was motive 
and intent to discriminate.135  By contrast, FLSA suits involve hard facts, 
such as the number of hours worked or compensation due.136  Accordingly, 
determining how much an FLSA plaintiff is owed is easier than determining 
how much an ADEA plaintiff is owed, and determining an FLSA settlement’s 
fairness is easier than determining an ADEA settlement’s fairness.137  
Another reason for the difference in standards is that the FLSA protects a 
population that is more vulnerable as a whole than the ADEA; the entire 
FLSA population consists of poorly paid working-class individuals, whereas 
at least part of the ADEA’s population is made up of highly paid workers 
who have the resources to protect themselves.138 
II.  WHICH COURTS REQUIRE THE PERMISSION SLIP TO BE SIGNED?:  
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER WHETHER APPROVAL IS REQUIRED 
Parts II.A and II.B discuss the circuit split over whether private settlements 
of FLSA claims need to be approved by a district court or the DOL to be 
enforceable.  Then, Parts II.C and II.D analyze a Second Circuit decision and 
an Eastern District of New York decision that the Second Circuit decision 
abrogated over whether Rule 41 voluntary dismissals of FLSA lawsuits need 
to be approved by a district court or the DOL to be enforceable. 
 
 133. Id. at 9–12. 
 134. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-221, pt. 3, at 14 (1989) (“Unlike the enforcement provisions of 
the [FLSA], which provide that employees may not waive their rights without supervision, the 
instant bill provides for the first time that a valid waiver may occur in limited circumstances.”). 
 135. See Waivers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:  Hearing on Aging 
Comm. Pub. No. 101-722 and Education & Labor Comm. Pub. No. 101-31, 101st Cong. 73 
(1989) [hereinafter ADEA Hearings] (statement of David A. Cathcart, Attorney at Law, 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP); S. REP. NO. 101-79, pt. 10, at 32; see also Runyan v. Nat’l 
Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 n.8 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 136. ADEA Hearings, supra note 135, at 73; S. REP. NO. 101-79, pt. 10, at 32; see also 
Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044 n.8. 
 137. ADEA Hearings, supra note 135, at 73; S. REP. NO. 101-79, pt. 10, at 32; see also 
Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044 n.8. 
 138. ADEA Hearings, supra note 135, at 72 (noting a landmark ADEA case in which the 
plaintiff was “a well-paid, well-educated, labor lawyer with many years of experience in this 
area” (quoting Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044)); see also Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1043 (noting that the 
FLSA was meant to protect “the lowest paid segment” of workers, while the ADEA protected 
“an entirely different segment of employees, many of whom were highly paid and capable of 
securing legal assistance without difficulty” (first quoting D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 
U.S. 108, 116 (1946))). 
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A.  The Eleventh Circuit Leads and (Almost) Everyone Follows:  
The Majority View That FLSA Settlements Require Approval 
In Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States,139 the Eleventh Circuit held 
that settlements of FLSA claims require court or DOL approval to be 
enforceable.140  Most federal courts have followed suit and adopted Lynn’s 
Food, making its holding the majority view.141 
The Eleventh Circuit held that FLSA settlements must occur in one of two 
ways to be enforceable:  (1) payment supervised by the Secretary of Labor 
under § 216(c) of the FLSA or (2) a district court’s stipulated judgment in 
lawsuits brought directly by employees under § 216(b) of the FLSA in which 
the parties have presented the court with a proposed settlement and the court 
has reviewed the settlement for fairness and determined it is fair and of a 
bona fide dispute.142  Under the second option, settlements of causes of action 
cannot be approved and settlements of lawsuits are not automatically 
approved but are simply approvable.143  Given that the settlement at issue did 
not fit either of these options, the court was not allowed to approve it, and the 
settlement was not enforceable.144 
While § 216(b) allows private lawsuits, it says nothing about stipulated 
judgments or reviewing settlements for fairness.  As a result, the court had to 
rely on case law as opposed to the text of the statute to provide support for 
the second option.145  Next, the court dealt with the 1947 Act’s provision 
allowing FLSA causes of action and lawsuits to be privately settled outside 
of litigation and without court or DOL approval.146  The court held that this 
provision applied only to lawsuits which “accrued prior to” the 1947 Act’s 
passage and was not applicable to the case.147 
In providing the reasoning for its holding, the court described the FLSA’s 
goal of protecting workers from low wages and long hours and the extra 
protection that workers need due to the unequal bargaining power between 
them and their employers.148  The court then focused on some of the glaring 
 
 139. 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982); see also supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 140. Id. at 1352–53. 
 141. See Kuettel, supra note 117, at 410 (calling this view the “traditional and majority 
approach”).  Almost all of the circuit courts that have dealt with the issue of settlement 
approval have come out this way. See, e.g., Seminiano v. Xyris Enter., Inc., 602 F. App’x 682, 
683 (9th Cir. 2015); Copeland v. ABB, Inc., 521 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2008); Taylor v. 
Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2007), superseded on other grounds, 
Whiting v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 416 F. App’x 312 (4th Cir. 2011).  But see Martin v. Spring 
Break ’83 Prods., 688 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that FLSA settlements do not need to 
be approved by a court or the DOL to be enforceable).  The Seventh Circuit acknowledged, 
but did not explicitly adopt, Lynn’s Food. See Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 
F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Courts . . . have refused to enforce wholly private settlements 
[of FLSA claims].”). 
 142. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1352–53, 1355. 
 143. Id. at 1354. 
 144. Id. at 1355. 
 145. See id. at 1353 (citing D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 113 & n.8 (1946); 
Jarrard v. Se. Shipbuilding Corp., 163 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1947)). 
 146. Id. at 1353 n.7. 
 147. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 253 (2012)). 
 148. Id. at 1352. 
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facts of the case.149  It also noted that a major problem with the settlement 
agreement was that it was not made in “the adversarial context of a 
lawsuit.”150  A lawsuit provides benefits to employees such as the increased 
likelihood of attorney representation.151  Given these benefits, had the 
settlement agreement been made in the context of a lawsuit, it may have been 
approvable.152  But the court held that, even though a settlement made in the 
adversarial context of a lawsuit is “more likely to reflect a reasonable 
compromise” than one made outside of it, court approval is still required for 
both.153  The absence of such a requirement would “be in clear derogation of 
the letter and spirit of the FLSA.”154 
B.  The Fifth Circuit Tries to Lead and No One Follows:  
The Minority View That FLSA Settlements 
Do Not Require Approval 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Productions, 
LLC155 stands in direct contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s Lynn’s Food 
decision.  It represents the minority view that private settlements of FLSA 
claims do not need to be approved by a court or the DOL to be enforceable.  
The case involved unionized technicians who had filed a grievance against 
their employer alleging that they had not been paid properly under the 
FLSA.156  The employees sent their union representative to investigate the 
issue but, when he concluded that it would be impossible to determine the 
number of hours the employees had actually worked, he agreed to settle the 
FLSA claims with the employer on behalf of the employees.157  The 
settlement was signed after the workers filed a lawsuit based on the FLSA 
claims.158 
The Fifth Circuit held that parties could privately settle FLSA claims 
without court or DOL approval “where there is a bona fide dispute as to the 
amount of hours worked or compensation due.”159  By settling a bona fide 
dispute, the workers were not waiving their statutory right to compensation; 
given that the parties disagreed about how much was owed to the employees 
it was impossible to determine whether the payment was more or less than 
the amount owed under the FLSA.160  Even though the workers may have 
been unhappy with the amount they received from the settlement, their 
 
 149. Id. at 1354 (holding that the employer’s actions in negotiating a settlement with its 
employees constituted a “virtual catalog of the sort of practices which the FLSA was intended 
to prohibit”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. 688 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 156. Id. at 249. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 249–50. 
 159. Id. at 255 (quoting Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631 
(W.D. Tex. 2005)). 
 160. Id. at 255–57. 
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representative agreed to that amount to settle the dispute over the number of 
hours worked and, therefore, the court did not have a legitimate reason to 
invalidate the settlement.161  Thus, the court held that the settlement, though 
not approved by a court or the DOL, was enforceable.162 
The Martin court sought to distinguish its case from Lynn’s Food by 
comparing the facts of the two cases.  Martin involved knowledgeable 
workers who were represented in negotiations and had legal counsel before 
settling the cases.163  Lynn’s Food, however, involved uninformed workers 
who neither had legal counsel nor seemed to know their rights.164  Further, 
the Martin court held that, because the settlement agreement had been entered 
into after the workers had initiated a lawsuit against their employer, the 
Lynn’s Food court’s concerns were not implicated.165  The problem with this 
reasoning was that the Martin court endorsed166 a district court case arising 
within the Fifth Circuit, Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equipment Co.,167 that 
involved an unrepresented worker agreeing to a settlement before a lawsuit 
had been initiated.168 
Martinez involved a worker who sued his employer for unpaid overtime 
compensation.169  Before the lawsuit, the plaintiff agreed to a settlement with 
his employer in which he accepted $1000 as a “full settlement for all overtime 
in question.”170  The court held that this settlement was enforceable even 
though it had not been approved by a court or the DOL.171  The court 
essentially applied a two-part test to determine whether the settlement was 
enforceable.  First, the settlement had to be of a bona fide dispute over the 
number of hours worked or compensation owed.172  Since the parties 
disagreed about whether the plaintiff had been paid overtime and what 
amount of overtime was owed to the plaintiff, a bona fide dispute existed.173  
Second, after a bona fide dispute was shown, the court determined whether 
the settlement agreement constituted a valid release of the plaintiff’s FLSA 
rights.174  The court held that for a settlement of a bona fide dispute to act as 
a valid release of rights, “[t]here must be a final meeting of the minds upon 
the compromise, with a full understanding of the dispute and the effect of the 
 
 161. See id. at 255–56 (holding that there was little danger of employees being 
disadvantaged where the settlement gave them “everything to which they [were] entitled under 
the FLSA at the time the agreement [was] reached” (quoting Thomas v. Louisiana, 534 F.2d 
613, 615 (5th Cir. 1976))).   
 162. Id. at 257. 
 163. See id. at 256 n.10. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 255, 257 (affirming the district court’s decision which adopted the holding 
and logic of Martinez and relying on the holding and logic of Martinez itself). 
 167. 361 F. Supp. 2d 608 (W.D. Tex. 2005). 
 168. Id. at 612–13. 
 169. Id. at 613. 
 170. Id. at 612. 
 171. Id. at 632. 
 172. Id. at 631. 
 173. Id. at 631–32. 
 174. Id. at 632. 
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compromise.”175  The settlement agreement constituted a valid release of the 
plaintiff’s FLSA rights because “‘[t]he remedy sought and settled [was] the 
precise remedy sought’ in the litigation”;176 the parties had agreed to settle 
the overtime compensation owed to the plaintiff and the plaintiff sued for that 
same overtime compensation. 
The Martinez court criticized the decisions requiring settlements to be 
approved for being too reliant on policy concerns such as poor labor 
conditions and unequal bargaining power.177  These concerns tempted courts 
to “promulgate social values which, at best, intrude upon the legislative 
sphere, and at worst reflect imprecise apprehensions of economics and 
desirable public policy.”178 
C.  Another Question Left Open?:  
Is the FLSA an Applicable Federal Statute Under Rule 41? 
While Lynn’s Food and Martin differ over whether private FLSA 
settlement agreements not approved by a court or the DOL are enforceable, 
some courts, including the Second Circuit, believe they did not answer 
whether courts or the DOL are required to evaluate and approve proposed 
settlement agreements for those settlements to later be enforceable.179 
In Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc.,180 an employee sued his 
former employer for unpaid overtime compensation.181  After an initial 
conference and some discovery, the parties privately settled the case and filed 
a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41.182  The court 
refused to accept the stipulation because the settlement had not been 
approved by the court or the DOL.183  Such approval was required because 
 
 175. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Strand v. Garden Valley Tel. Co., 51 F. Supp. 898, 
905 (D. Minn. 1943)). 
 176. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Strozier v. Gen. Motors Corp., 635 F.2d 424, 
426 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 177. See id. at 627–29.  The court noted that Lynn’s Foodthe only decision that squarely 
dealt with the issue of whether FLSA settlements required approvalwas largely based on 
the egregious facts of the case. Id. at 628 (citing Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 
679 F.2d 1350, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 178. Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 861 
(5th Cir. 1975)). 
 179. See, e.g., Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“[Lynn’s Food and Martin] arise in the context of whether a private FLSA settlement is 
enforceable.  The question before us, however, asks whether the parties can enter into a private 
stipulated dismissal of FLSA claims with prejudice, without the involvement of the district 
court or DOL, that may later be enforceable.”); Nyazee v. MBR Mgmt. Corp., No. 4:14-CV-
01561, 2016 WL 126363, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 12, 2016) (“[Lynn’s Food does not] inform the 
Court whether it must evaluate and approve a private FLSA settlement, or whether such 
approval is a prerequisite for subsequent judicial enforcement of a private settlement.”); 
Carrillo v. Dandan Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 124, 131 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Whether an FLSA settlement 
is legally enforceable, which [Lynn’s Food] addressed, is distinct from whether a court 
mustor shouldevaluate such a proposed settlement ex ante.”). 
 180. 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 181. Id. at 200. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  The parties then appealed the case to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the 
district court’s holding that the settlement had to be approved and remanded the case. Id. at 
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the FLSA qualified as an “applicable federal statute” under Rule 41.184  Thus, 
the case could not be dismissed without a court order or DOL approval.185 
The Second Circuit held that the FLSA qualified as an applicable federal 
statute under Rule 41 because of the policy underlying the FLSA.186  The 
court focused on the Supreme Court’s liberal interpretation of the FLSA as a 
statute with particularly broad protections187 and a goal “to extend the 
frontiers of social progress” by ensuring a living wage to all workers.188  The 
court’s concern was that private settlements would allow employers to 
continue to take advantage of their workers.189  Without an approval 
requirement, workers would not get the pay they deserved under the statute 
and less scrupulous employers would not be incentivized to change their 
underhanded dealings.190  This would cause workers as a whole to suffer.191 
D.  The Martin of Rule 41:  Picerni 
The Cheeks decision abrogated an earlier decision, Picerni v. Bilingual Seit 
& Preschool, Inc.,192 made two years earlier by the Eastern District of New 
York.  In that case, a teacher brought a collective action against her employer 
for minimum wage violations.193  Not long after the lawsuit’s 
commencement, the parties settled and the plaintiff filed a notice of 
acceptance of an offer of judgment.194  After the court declined to enter 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,195 the parties were 
directed by a court order to file a motion to approve the settlement.196  Four 
months later, the court vacated its own order and allowed the parties to settle 
without court approval.197  The court held that the FLSA was not an 
applicable federal statute under Rule 41, and thus the parties could 
voluntarily dismiss the case without approval.198 
 
201.  The lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice with the parties stipulating that they did 
not believe their settlement agreement to be binding and enforceable without court approval. 
See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., No. 12-CV-04199 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2017); 
Response to September 21, 2016 Order, Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., No. 12-CV-
04199 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2016). 
 184. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (quoting A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. 
 192. 925 F. Supp. 2d 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), abrogated by Cheeks, 796 F.3d 199. 
 193. Id. at 369. 
 194. Id. 
 195. FED. R. CIV. P. 68.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 allows a defendant to serve on 
the plaintiff “an offer to allow judgment on specified terms” that the plaintiff can accept, 
essentially acting as a settlement. Id. 
 196. Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (holding that because it was an FLSA case, it had to 
be approved by a court or the DOL and could not be resolved under a Rule 68 offer of 
judgment). 
 197. Id. at 379. 
 198. Id. at 373. 
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In coming to the conclusion that the FLSA was not an applicable federal 
statute, the court focused on the absence of an explicit approval requirement 
in the FLSA, a feature of all applicable federal statutes and rules under Rule 
41.199  The court also highlighted a practical problem:  many FLSA cases are 
so small that if courts were to deny settlements, then parties would lack 
incentive to proceed further with litigation.200  In these types of cases, 
rejecting a settlement not only fails to accomplish anything, but it harms the 
parties.201  The parties have to pay additional litigation expenses they cannot 
afford and, even if the employee wins, the employer likely will not pay.202  
Further, the court is keeping a plaintiff from a settlement that is small yet 
acceptable and helpful to him, all in the name of “some Platonic form of the 
ideal of judicial vindication.”203  Given these practical consequences, the 
court reasoned that rejecting a settlement that everyone was happy with did 
nothing to accomplish the FLSA’s purposes.204 
The issues brought before the Cheeks and Picerni courts were whether the 
FLSA constituted an applicable federal statute under Rule 41 and therefore 
whether FLSA cases could be voluntarily dismissed without court or DOL 
approval.205  But the courts framed these questions differently.  The Cheeks 
court addressed whether parties could voluntarily dismiss an FLSA lawsuit 
under Rule 41 without court or DOL approval and later enforce that 
settlement.206  The Picerni court addressed only the first half of that 
question;207 it did not decide whether a voluntary dismissal would later be 
enforceable.  In fact, the court recognized that parties dismissing FLSA cases 
under Rule 41 would be “[taking] their chances that their settlement [would] 
not be effective.”208  Thus, unlike the Cheeks court, the Picerni court 
assumed either that unapproved settlements would be made without prejudice 
or that it did not necessarily matter for enforceability purposes whether they 
were made with or without prejudice.209  The main goal of its holding was to 
ensure that parties would be given the power under Rule 41 to dismiss FLSA 
lawsuits when and how they wanted to.210  The Cheeks holding, by contrast, 
dealt explicitly with dismissals made with prejudice and did not address the 
 
 199. Id. at 375; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
 201. See id. at 378. 
 202. See id. 
 203. Id. at 377.  The court also noted that by rejecting the settlement, the court would be 
keeping a plaintiff’s attorney, likely satisfied with his fee, and a defendant, who could barely 
afford to pay the settlement, let alone hire an attorney, from closure. Id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2015); 
Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 368–69. 
 206. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 204. 
 207. Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 374. 
 208. Id. at 373. 
 209. Id. (“[I]t is one thing to say that . . . a private settlement will not, under certain 
circumstances, be enforced in subsequent litigation [but] it is quite another to say that even if 
the parties want to take their chances that their settlement will not be effective, the Court will 
not permit them to do so.”). 
 210. Id. at 372–73. 
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issue of how courts should handle dismissals of FLSA lawsuits without 
prejudice.211 
III.  SHOULD THE PERMISSION SLIP HAVE TO BE SIGNED?:  
A SOLUTION TO THE APPROVAL REQUIREMENT 
Part III.A argues that, despite some differences, the Fifth-Eleventh Circuit 
split is very similar to the discrepancy between the Second Circuit and the 
Eastern District of New York.  Part III.B discusses why the FLSA should not 
be considered an applicable federal statute under Rule 41 and why Cheeks 
should be overturned.  Next, Part III.C discusses the implications of that 
conclusion, namely that settlements and voluntary dismissals of FLSA 
lawsuits should be allowed without court approval.  As a result of this 
decision, Lynn’s Food must be overturned.  Part III.D then argues that even 
though FLSA settlements of lawsuits should be allowed without court 
approval as Rule 41 voluntary dismissals, private settlements of FLSA causes 
of action should require court or DOL approval to be enforceable.  Martin 
and Martinez should, therefore, be overturned.  Finally, Part III.E suggests 
the congressional action required to implement the decisions made in Parts 
III.B to III.D. 
A.  Reconciling the Lynn’s Food-Martin Circuit Split 
and the Cheeks-Picerni Conflict 
There are some differences between the Cheeks and Picerni decisions and 
the Lynn’s Food and Martin decisions.  The holdings in Lynn’s Food and 
Martin were based on an interpretation of the FLSA.212  The holdings in 
Cheeks and Picerni were based on both an interpretation of the FLSA and of 
Rule 41.213  Lynn’s Food involved a settlement that had been agreed to before 
a lawsuit.214  While Martin involved a settlement agreed to after a lawsuit 
had begun, its reasoning was based on a case involving a settlement that had 
been agreed to before a lawsuit.215  In Cheeks and Picerni, the settlement was 
agreed to after the lawsuit had begun.216  In Lynn’s Food, the employer was 
trying to enforce the settlement agreement.217  In Martin, the employees were 
 
 211. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 201 n.2 (“As it is not before us, we leave for another day the 
question of whether parties may settle such cases without court approval or DOL supervision 
by entering into a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) stipulation without prejudice.”). 
 212. See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that the route for settling private FLSA settlements is “provided in the context of suits 
brought . . . under section 216(b) [of the FLSA]”); Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., LLC, 
797 F. Supp. 2d 719, 730 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d, 688 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2012) (adopting the 
holding of a case with reasoning based on a “thorough historical analysis of the FLSA, its 
amendments, and case law” (citing Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 
608, 631 (W.D. Tex. 2005))). 
 213. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 201; Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
 214. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1352. 
 215. Martin, 688 F.3d at 255. 
 216. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 200; Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 369. 
 217. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1351–52. 
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trying to prevent the enforcement of the settlement agreement.218  In Cheeks 
and Picerni, both parties wanted the settlement agreement to be approved.219 
Despite these differences, the Cheeks and Lynn’s Food holdings are 
similar.  The main holding in Lynn’s Food was that unapproved FLSA 
settlements are not enforceable.220  Its reasoning for this holding was that 
private lawsuits can only be settled by the parties proposing a settlement of a 
lawsuit to the court and having that settlement approved by a stipulated 
judgment after the court scrutinizes it for fairness.221  Thus, despite what 
Cheeks and its progeny assert,222 the court in Lynn’s Food did not leave open 
the question of whether courts or the DOL are required to evaluate and 
approve proposed settlement agreements for those settlements to later be 
enforceable; it answered this question in the affirmative.  For this reason, the 
settlement in Lynn’s Food was not enforceable. 
This interpretation of Lynn’s Food is supported by a decision arising in the 
same circuit.  In Dees v. Hydradry, Inc.,223 the court held that parties could 
not voluntarily dismiss FLSA lawsuits under Rule 41 because the Lynn’s 
Food court held that a district court must approve the dismissal of an FLSA 
lawsuit for that dismissal to be later enforceable.224  Thus, like Cheeks, Dees 
held that the FLSA was an applicable federal statute and that dismissals of 
FLSA lawsuits required court approval.225  Unlike Cheeks, Dees squarely 
relied on the reasoning in Lynn’s Food to support that proposition.226 
Thus, while the fact patterns and language used in Lynn’s Food and Cheeks 
are different, their holdings are essentially the same:  both require FLSA 
settlements of lawsuits to be either stipulated judgments by the court or 
approved by the DOL to be enforceable.227  Both holdings also require courts 
or the DOL to review settlements for fairness before approving them.228  One 
interesting difference between the two decisions is their treatment of bona 
fide dispute requirements.  The Lynn’s Food decision requires settlements to 
be of a bona fide dispute to be approved.229  The Cheeks court not only 
 
 218. Martin, 688 F.3d at 254. 
 219. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 200–01; Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 369. 
 220. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355. 
 221. Id. at 1353. 
 222. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 223. 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2010). 
 224. Id. at 1237–38, 1244. 
 225. See id. at 1244; see also Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 
(2d Cir. 2015). 
 226. See Dees, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1244. 
 227. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206 (holding that “stipulated dismissals settling FLSA claims 
with prejudice require the approval of the district court or the DOL to take effect” (emphasis 
added)); Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1353 (holding that “a proposed settlement” of FLSA claims 
requires approval by a district court’s “stipulated judgment” or the DOL to take effect 
(emphasis added)).  Approval of a stipulated dismissal is the definition of a stipulated 
judgment. See Agreed Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “agreed 
judgment” as “[a] settlement that becomes a court judgment when the judge sanctions it” and 
noting that it is also termed “consent judgment; stipulated judgment; judgment by consent” 
(emphasis added)); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 228. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 200–01; Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355. 
 229. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355. 
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refused to decide whether a bona fide dispute existed in its case, but it also 
refused to rule on whether the settlement had to be of a bona fide dispute to 
be approved,230 even though almost all courts recognize this bona fide 
dispute requirement.231 
B.  The FLSA Is Not an Applicable 
Federal Statute Under Rule 41 
Part III.B.1 discusses how the FLSA differs from applicable federal 
statutes and rules under Rule 41 both textually and characteristically.  It 
concludes that these differences should prevent the FLSA from being exempt 
from Rule 41.  Next, Part III.B.2 briefly notes the concept of dismissing cases 
with prejudice.  Because the FLSA is not an applicable federal statute under 
Rule 41, FLSA lawsuits should be able to be dismissed with or without 
prejudice.  Based on these determinations, Cheeks must be overturned given 
its holding that the FLSA is an applicable federal statute under Rule 41 and 
that FLSA lawsuits cannot be voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.232 
1.  The FLSA Does Not Fit 
the Applicable Federal Statute Mold 
The FLSA is not an applicable federal statute under Rule 41.  While the 
FLSA may be a protective statute, it would be an outcast among the other 
rules and statutes that are exempt from Rule 41.  The most important 
difference between the FLSA and those rules and statutes is that the FLSA 
contains no provision explicitly requiring the approval of private 
settlements.233  Further, Rule 41’s advisory committee specifically pointed 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1329 and 31 U.S.C. § 3730 as statutes that would qualify as 
applicable federal statutes in its note to the Rule when the Rule was adopted 
in 1937.234  The note states, “Provisions regarding dismissal in such statutes 
as [these] are preserved by [Rule 41(a)(1)].”235  The “in such statutes as”236 
language suggests that this was not meant to be an exclusive list.  The 
“[p]rovisions regarding dismissal”237 language would disqualify the FLSA 
as an applicable federal statute, however, as it has no such provision to 
preserve.  This language would also disqualify 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) from 
being an applicable federal statute since it has no such provision to preserve.  
Until Congress adopts such a provision for each statute, one should not be 
read into either 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) or the FLSA. 
 
 230. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 203 n.3 (“[W]e express no opinion as to whether a bona fide 
dispute exists here, or what the district court must consider in deciding whether to approve the 
putative settlement of Cheeks’ claims.”). 
 231. See Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013) (“All courts seem to agree that if an FLSA release is going to be upheld, it must be 
where there is a bona fide dispute . . . .”), abrogated by Cheeks, 796 F.3d 199. 
 232. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
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Congress, however, should not adopt such a provision for the FLSA.  Not 
only does the FLSA lack the explicit requirements of an applicable federal 
statute or rule but it lacks the characteristics of one that would make approval 
necessary. 
Most FLSA lawsuitsunlike class actions, derivative actions, and actions 
relating to unincorporated associationsdo not involve small groups of 
plaintiffs representing large groups of uninterested plaintiffs who were added 
to the lawsuit by operation of law.238  To be a plaintiff in an FLSA case, an 
individual must initiate the action or opt in to a collective action.239  This 
results in smaller classes of more-engaged plaintiffs.240  Accordingly, the 
interests of all plaintiffs are better protected in collective actions than in class 
actions. 
Unlike lawsuits under Rule 66, in which the court appoints a receiver, 
FLSA lawsuits typically do not involve an extraordinary investment of time 
or effort on the court’s part.241  In FLSA cases, the court does not have to 
appoint a special officer, and the parties often work out a settlement on their 
own.242 
The FLSA also differs from applicable federal statutes in important ways.  
Section 1329 requires U.S. Attorneys to prosecute every suit that the United 
States brings under the relevant statutes.243  The FLSA has no such 
requirement.  In suits brought under § 3730(b), relators can manipulate 
settlements by bringing and settling suits on behalf of the United States that 
the United States does not get involved in to achieve settlements that are 
beneficial to themselves but not to the United States.244  There is no such 
concern with claims brought under the FLSA; plaintiffs still have to either 
bring the suit or affirmatively opt in to it and are therefore much more likely 
to be engaged in the suit.245 
It is possible that settlements in FLSA cases could be manipulated if 
settlements of private lawsuits did not have to be approved but settlements of 
causes of action did, as this Note suggests should be the case.246  If this were 
the case, unscrupulous employers would be incentivized to construct 
litigation that skirts the approval requirement for settling causes of action.  
Further, plaintiffs’ attorneys could also be incentivized to work with 
employers to construct this litigation and maximize the attorneys’ fees they 
would receive in a settlement, which would likely decrease the amount the 
plaintiff would receive. 
 
 238. See supra notes 45–50, 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 239. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); see also supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
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 241. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 242. Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
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 246. See infra Part III.C–E. 
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Given these perverse incentives, it may be argued that if settlements of 
causes of action have to be approved, settlements of lawsuits should have to 
be approved as well.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys bargaining away their client’s 
award in exchange for more money for themselves parallels the problem of 
relators bargaining away something belonging to the United States, but there 
are important differences between the two.247  In lawsuits brought under 
§ 3730(b), relators are the ones who sue; the United States has the right not 
to intervene or get involved.248  This is not the case in private FLSA lawsuits; 
while plaintiffs’ attorneys can construct litigation, plaintiffs themselves still 
either have to bring the suit or affirmatively opt in to it.249  Thus, employees 
would likely be more involved in a settlement than the United States would 
be.  Further, many plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in FLSA cases are contingent on 
the case’s outcome and thus inextricably linked to settlement amounts in 
FLSA lawsuits;250 the better an attorney does advocating for his client, the 
higher the settlement likely will be, resulting in higher contingent fees.  But 
with lawsuits brought under § 3730(b), a relator’s award is not necessarily 
linked with the United States’ award.  For example, a relator can bargain 
away a nonmonetary award from the United States251 or have a separate 
additional claim.252  Thus, decreasing the United States’ award would not 
necessarily decrease the relator’s award.  As a result, relators may have less 
incentive to work in the United States’ best interests than FLSA plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have to work in their clients’ best interests.  Given these 
differences, it is not necessary for settlements of private FLSA lawsuits to be 
approved.  Even though an approval requirement is not necessary or 
appropriate, these perverse incentivesin addition to the vulnerability of the 
population the FLSA protects and the Act’s purposemake it clear that some 
protections are required for settlements of FLSA lawsuits.  Consequently, 
this Note suggests implementing rigorous standards short of requiring 
approval that will seek to protect plaintiffs in FLSA lawsuits from unfair 
settlements.253 
Finally, § 1915(g) should not be considered an applicable federal statute, 
but even if it is, it is distinguishable from the FLSA.  Unlike allowing for 
voluntary dismissals in cases implicating § 1915(g), allowing for voluntary 
dismissals of FLSA lawsuits would not lead to a procedural loophole.  
Section 1915(g) would be rendered meaningless if courts were not allowed 
to deny voluntary dismissals when necessary.254  In contrast, the FLSA would 
not be rendered meaningless without an approval requirement.  Further, the 
issue arising under § 1915(g) involves notices of dismissal filed only by the 
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plaintiff.255  The issue arising under the FLSA, however, involves 
stipulations of dismissals filed by all parties.256  Thus, settlements are not 
implicated in issues arising under § 1915(g) as they are in issues arising under 
the FLSA. 
2.  Prejudice 
If the FLSA is not an applicable federal statute under Rule 41, parties 
should be able to voluntarily dismiss FLSA lawsuits through stipulations of 
dismissal.257  Even though dismissal without prejudice is the default rule 
under Rule 41, parties are also allowed to dismiss their cases with prejudice 
if so stipulated.258  The same should apply to parties settling FLSA lawsuits.  
Despite Picerni and Cheeks,259 because the FLSA is not an applicable federal 
statute, there is nothing special about it that would require FLSA lawsuits to 
be voluntarily dismissed only without prejudice and not with prejudice. 
C.  Parties Should Be Able to Dismiss FLSA Lawsuits 
Without Court Approval If the Dismissal Is 
Knowing and Voluntary and of a Bona Fide Dispute 
Part III.C.1 discusses the benefits the court in Lynn’s Food believed the 
adversarial context of lawsuits had on negotiations of FLSA settlements.  It 
also explains how those benefits should preclude the need for settlements of 
FLSA lawsuits to be approved.  Next, Part III.C.2 examines the negative 
impacts that an approval requirement for FLSA lawsuits may have on the 
ability to sufficiently enforce the FLSA.  Parts III.C.3 and III.C.4 then 
consider how two amendments to the FLSA, the 1947 Act and the Fair Labor 
Standards Amendments of 1949, lend themselves to an understanding that 
Congress did not intend for settlements of FLSA lawsuits to require approval.  
Based on these arguments, the holdings in Lynn’s Food and subsequent 
decisions260 should be overturned.  Finally, Part III.C.5 discusses the middle 
ground that needs to and can be found between requiring approval of 
settlements of FLSA lawsuits and allowing the parties to dismiss such 
lawsuits voluntarily without any restrictions. 
1.  Lynn’s Food:  The Importance of the Context of a Lawsuit 
In holding that settlements of FLSA lawsuits have to be approved to be 
enforceable, the court in Lynn’s Food gave convincing reasoning for the 
opposing proposition:  that settlements of FLSA lawsuits should be 
enforceable even without approval.261  The court noted that private 
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settlements are more likely to be permissible if agreed to in the context of a 
lawsuit because of the adversarial nature of lawsuits.262  This adversarial 
nature helps to level the playing field between employer and employee.  In a 
lawsuit, the employee goes on the offensive, while in a settlement agreed to 
outside of a lawsuit, a predatory employer is more likely to go on the 
offensive.263 
Further, the Eleventh Circuit held that private settlements are more likely 
to be permissible if agreed to in the context of a lawsuit because employees 
are more likely to be represented by attorneys who can protect their 
interests.264  Employees represented by attorneys generally receive more 
valuable settlements than unrepresented employees.265  An attorney also 
better informs employees of their rights under the FLSA, so they have a 
clearer sense of what they are entitled to under the Act and what they are 
agreeing to if they settle.266 
2.  Doing Justice to the Parties 
The reasons provided in Lynn’s Food are not the only reasons why 
settlements of FLSA lawsuits should be enforceable without court approval.  
Another reason is the longstanding public policy favoring private settlements 
of lawsuits.267  Under Rule 41, parties generally have an absolute right to 
dismiss a lawsuit.268  As the applicable federal statutes and rules under Rule 
41 show, unless there is an explicit provision as well as a very good reason 
why parties should not be able to privately settle their lawsuits, dismissing 
lawsuits should be their prerogative.269  Requiring court approval for 
settlement FLSA lawsuits takes that prerogative away. 
Those in favor of an approval requirement in FLSA cases reason that it is 
necessary to ensure workers are not taken advantage of in settlements.270  If 
employers know violating the FLSA will at worst lead to a slap on the wrist 
in the form of a cheap settlement, they have little incentive to stop violating 
the FLSA.271  Without such incentives, employers will continue to race to the 
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bottom and undercut one other on wages, negatively impacting all 
workers.272  By trying to protect all workers through an approval 
requirement, however, courts can hurt individual plaintiffs and disincentivize 
them from bringing FLSA lawsuits.273  The FLSA relies on workers to act as 
private attorneys general in bringing lawsuits.274  As low wage workers, 
many of these workers lack the resources to bring a lawsuit or to continue 
with one if the court rejects their settlement.275  If court approval 
requirements become too tedious, many workers may opt to settle privately 
out of court instead of investing time, money, and effort in a lawsuit that they 
may not be able to see through to the end.  If this happens, the important 
private attorney general role will cease to be filled as individual plaintiffs will 
not find it in their interest to bring a lawsuit. 
3.  Implications of the 1947 Act 
One argument in support of an approval requirement derives from the 1947 
Act.  This Act allowed all FLSA causes of action and lawsuits in which the 
parties had a bona fide dispute over the compensation owed to be settled 
without court approval as long as those claims and lawsuits were based on 
FLSA violations prior to the 1947 Act’s passage on May 14, 1947.276  It also 
allowed liquidated damages to be waived based on violations prior to May 
14, 1947, even without a bona fide dispute.277  But, since the 1947 Act did 
not provide guidance about how FLSA causes of action and lawsuits based 
on violations after its passage could be settled, there is no current provision 
to guide courts in determining whether settlements require court approval to 
be enforceable.278 
Those in favor of an approval requirement reason that Congress made the 
1947 Act’s settlement provision applicable only to pre-1947 Act violations 
to signal that further legislation would be needed to make post-1947 Act 
unapproved settlements enforceable.279  However, the Martinez court 
disagreed; pointing to the 1947 Act’s legislative history, the court held that 
despite the 1947 Act’s retrospective application, Congress’s goal was not to 
prohibit private, unapproved settlements but to leave the decision of whether 
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to prohibit such settlements to a “determination under other law.”280  Because 
there is no such provision or “other law” requiring the approval of 
settlements, the Martinez court held that unapproved settlements should be 
enforceable.281  Given the explicit approval requirements in applicable 
federal statutes and rules under Rule 41, the Martinez decision presents the 
better understanding of the implications of the 1947 Act on whether FLSA 
settlements of lawsuits need to be approved.  If such settlements had to be 
approved under the FLSA, there would be an explicit approval requirement 
in either § 216(b) or some “other law.” 
4.  Implications of the 
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949 
Section 216(c) of the FLSAwhich was added to the FLSA under the Fair 
Labor Standards Amendments of 1949also raises questions about whether 
private settlements of lawsuits need to be approved to be enforceable.  This 
provision states that the Secretary of Labor “is authorized” to supervise the 
payment of back wages to employees.282  Those in favor of an approval 
requirement note that such a provision signals that all settlements of FLSA 
lawsuits and causes of action should be supervised or approved by the 
DOL.283  But DOL supervision was meant only as an additional option to 
employees bringing lawsuits.284  It seems unlikely, therefore, that Congress 
meant to require court approval of private FLSA lawsuits when it allowed for 
DOL supervision.  Furthermore, since such a provision was included in 
§ 216(c) but not in § 216(b), the provision governing private lawsuits, it 
seems that Congress did not intend for courts to play the same or similar 
supervisory role in private lawsuits. 
5.  Adopting the Knowing and Voluntary 
and Bona Fide Dispute Provisions 
Although an approval requirement is not proper, the FLSA needs 
safeguards to ensure that the vulnerable population it protects will not be 
exploited or taken advantage of in settlements.  While a lawsuit in and of 
itself can serve as a safeguard against the exploitation of employees in a 
settlement given its adversarial context,285 it is not enough of a safeguard to 
sufficiently protect the population the FLSA serves.  The best safeguards that 
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can be adopted to provide sufficient protection without impinging on an 
employee’s right to voluntarily dismiss a lawsuit under Rule 41 are a 
knowing and voluntary standard and a bona fide dispute provision. 
Under the knowing and voluntary standard, parties would still be able to 
voluntarily dismiss an FLSA lawsuit under Rule 41 but only if the dismissal 
was knowing and voluntary.  Such an amendment would recognize that the 
FLSA is not an applicable federal statute under Rule 41.  Thus, it would also 
recognize that FLSA lawsuits should be allowed to be dismissed and 
privately settled without court or DOL approval.  Despite allowing for 
voluntary dismissals, such an amendment would still recognize that the 
FLSA is a highly protective statute.  This is especially true given the ADEA’s 
use of a knowing and voluntary standard to protect the elderly.286  Adopting 
the standard only for dismissals of lawsuits and not settlements of causes of 
actionwhich would still require approval287would recognize Congress’s 
intent that the FLSA be a more protective statute, at least regarding 
settlements, than the ADEA.288  This is because the ADEA applies some 
version of the standard to both settlements of lawsuits and causes of action.289  
In addition, adopting the ADEA’s standard would be appropriate because the 
ADEA’s enforcement mechanisms are modeled after the FLSA’s 
enforcement mechanisms.290 
With a provision requiring a bona fide dispute, parties could dismiss 
lawsuits only if the dismissal was predicated on a bona fide dispute over the 
number of hours worked or amount owed.  Both sides of the approval debate 
recognize that settlements of FLSA lawsuits and causes of action must be of 
a bona fide dispute to be enforceable.291  Without a bona fide dispute 
requirement, the parties would be able to settle for less than what employees 
were owed.  Allowing employees to settle for less than what they are owed 
would violate both the letter and the spirit of the FLSA.292 
D.  Enforceability of Private Settlements of FLSA Causes of Action 
Part III.D.1 discusses the practical concerns that exist in settlements of 
causes of action but not in settlements of lawsuits.  As a result of these 
differences, settlements of FLSA causes of action should require approval 
while settlements of FLSA lawsuits should not.  Next, Part III.D.2 explains 
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how the FLSA’s enforcement provisions lead to the conclusion that 
settlements of causes of action require approval.  Part III.D.3 then examines 
how the differences between FLSA’s treatment of settlements of causes of 
action and other federal employment statutes’ treatment of settlements of 
causes of action lead to the conclusion that settlements of FLSA causes of 
action require approval.  Based on these determinations, the holdings in 
Martin and Martinez should be overturned.293  Finally, Part III.D.4 suggests 
additional measures that should be taken regarding settling FLSA causes of 
action. 
1.  Practical Concerns Regarding Private Settlements 
of FLSA Causes of Action 
There are practical concerns about private settlements of FLSA causes of 
action that do not exist for FLSA lawsuits.  The biggest concern is predatory 
employers taking advantage of uninformed, unrepresented employees.294  In 
settlements of causes of action, employers usually reach out to employees, 
while in lawsuits, employees sue employers.295  As a result, employees are 
more likely to be passive bystanders in a settlement of a cause of action than 
in a settlement of a lawsuit.  Further, the benefits of a lawsuit’s adversarial 
context that are pivotal to negotiating a fair settlement are lost in the 
settlement of a cause of action.296  Lynn’s Food’s facts provide a glaring 
example of this.297  Had the employees in that case been able to bring a 
lawsuit, they would have learned about the DOL’s finding of FLSA 
violations and could have been represented by an attorney.  Given the case’s 
egregious facts and the DOL’s previous finding, the employees likely would 
have been paid what they were owed under the FLSA rather than settling for 
much less.  Given these facts, it is clear that in settlements of causes of action, 
employees are unable to adequately assert their rights against employers in a 
setting that levels the playing field or have their interests properly 
represented.  Thus, unapproved settlements of causes of action should not be 
allowed. 
One counterargument against differentiating between settlements of 
lawsuits and settlements of causes of action is that in some settlements of 
causes of action, employees may be represented either by a union 
representative or by an attorney.298  In such cases, having representation 
arguably helps to achieve the benefits of an adversarial context.   
Attorney representation is far from the only benefit a lawsuit confers on 
plaintiffs.  Lawsuits have the ability to put unequal parties on an equal 
plane.299  The threat of going to trial and obtaining a judgment in a lawsuit 
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from an impartial adjudicator can help to erase the disparities in resources 
between the parties that can influence a settlement in favor of the 
employer.300  Such a threat could make employers more responsive to the 
facts and merits of a case than their own bargaining power.  Further, lawsuits 
avail plaintiffs of the ability to engage in discovery.301  Engaging in discovery 
can give plaintiffs a better sense of the merits of their case and access to more 
information that can be helpful in negotiating a settlement or deciding 
whether to go to trial.302   
Thus, the reason settlements of causes of action, but not lawsuits, should 
require approval is twofold.  First, as a result of the benefits litigation confers 
on plaintiffs, employees that bring lawsuits need less protection in 
negotiating settlements than employees who settle causes of action.  Second, 
requiring approval for settlements of causes of action, but not lawsuits, 
encourages employees to pursue litigation and thereby obtain its benefits.  
This helps level the playing field with employers and lessen the inequities of 
bargaining power inherent in the employee-employer relationship. 
2.  Implications of the FLSA’s Enforcement Provisions 
The FLSA’s enforcement provisions provide further reasoning for why 
settlements of causes of action, but not settlements of lawsuits, should have 
to be approved.  The FLSA gives employees three options to pursue when 
seeking to recover unpaid wages or compensation:  (1) bring a lawsuit against 
your employer, (2) have the Secretary of Labor bring a lawsuit against your 
employer on your behalf, or (3) have the Secretary of Labor supervise the 
payment of unpaid wages or compensation.303  There is no provision 
allowing employees to settle their causes of action under the FLSA without 
supervision.  In fact, the supervision option in § 216(c) implies that if 
employees settle their claims outside of a lawsuit, the settlement must be 
approved to be enforceable.304  While there is no explicit provision in 
§ 216(b) that lawsuits can be settled without court approval, the FLSA allows 
such settlements when read in tandem with Rule 41.  Because there is no 
option under the FLSA for employees to settle their causes of action in an 
unapproved agreement with their employers, such an agreement should not 
be enforceable. 
3.  The FLSA Is Different from Other Employment Statutes 
The conclusion that settlements of FLSA causes of action must be 
approved by the court or DOL to be enforceable is further supported by the 
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FLSA’s status as the only federal employment statute considered in this Note 
for which both Congress and the courts have refused to allow or uphold 
private settlements of causes of action.  The FLSA, unlike the ADEA305 and 
FMLA,306 has no provision regarding the private settlement of causes of 
action.  And unlike Title VII’s case law,307 most of the FLSA’s case law does 
not allow unapproved settlements of causes of action to be enforceable.308 
The FLSA’s characteristics also call for it to be treated differently than 
other federal employment statutes.  The ADEA, FMLA, and Title VII are all 
employment statutes concerning discrimination.  Their cases, therefore, often 
involve nuanced issues of fact that are more difficult to determine than the 
issues of fact that arise in FLSA cases.309  Accordingly, fair settlements of 
ADEA, FMLA, and Title VII claims are harder to determine than FLSA 
claims.310  Further, the ADEA, FMLA, and Title VII do not protect 
populations as vulnerable to exploitation as the population protected by the 
FLSA.311  The FLSA seeks to protect the lowest class of workers who are 
being paid below a living wage.312  While those being discriminated against 
for taking medical leave or on the basis of their race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin may also be vulnerable, the FMLA and Title VII apply 
generally to all employees.313  The ADEA does target a vulnerable 
population—the elderly.314  But because the ADEA protects elderly 
employees of all incomes, at least some elderly people have better resources 
to protect themselves against exploitation than the low wage workers 
protected by the FLSA.315 
Congress and the courts have had ample opportunity to allow private 
settlements of FLSA causes of action.  They have acknowledged as much 
when allowing private settlements of causes of action under other federal 
employment statutes.316  However, they have continued to differentiate the 
FLSA from these statutes by requiring settlements of FLSA causes of action 
be approved.  The same can be said about Congress’s and the courts’ 
treatment of the approval of settlements of FLSA lawsuits.  However, the 
difference is that if Rule 41 does not explicitly require approval of lawsuit 
settlements, the assumption is that lawsuits can be voluntarily dismissed 
without approval.  But with federal employment statutes, if there is no 
explicit provision or case law, then it should be assumed that settlements 
must be approved to be enforceable.  Just as the FLSA’s lack of an express 
approval requirement provision indicates that it is not an applicable federal 
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statute, the FLSA’s lack of a provision or case law supporting the ability to 
settle causes of action without approval indicates that such a provision was 
not intended. 
Given these differences, the FLSA should not follow the ADEA, FMLA, 
and Title VII in allowing causes of action to be privately settled without 
approval. 
4.  Adopting the Bona Fide Dispute Provision 
Settlement of FLSA causes of action should require a bona fide dispute in 
addition to approval by the DOL or the courts.  Both sides of the approval 
debate agree that settlements of FLSA lawsuits and causes of action must be 
of a bona fide dispute to be allowed, and without a bona fide dispute 
requirement, the parties would be able to settle for less than what employees 
were owed, which would violate both the letter and the spirit of the FLSA.317 
E.  Congress Needs to Take Action 
To implement the decisions mentioned above,318 Congress needs to amend 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  The following provisions should be added: 
 
(1) Parties to lawsuits brought under this subsection may dismiss such 
lawsuits with or without prejudice through stipulated dismissals 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) without the 
approval of a district court or the Secretary of Labor if such 
dismissals are knowing and voluntary and a bona fide dispute exists 
over the number of hours worked or compensation owed.  A 
dismissal may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless, at a 
minimum 
(a) the dismissal is part of an agreement between the individual 
and the employer that is written in a manner calculated to be 
understood by such individual or by the average individual 
eligible to participate; 
(b) the dismissal specifically refers to rights or claims arising 
under this chapter; 
(c) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise 
after the date the waiver is executed; 
(d) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for 
consideration in addition to anything of value to which the 
individual already is entitled; 
(e) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an 
attorney prior to executing the agreement; and 
 
 317. See supra Part III.C.5. 
 318. See supra Part III.B–D. 
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(f) the individual is given a reasonable period of time within 
which to consider the settlement agreement. 
(2) Waiver of any cause of action arising under section 206 or 207 shall 
not be enforceable without the existence of a bona fide dispute over 
the number of hours worked or compensation owed and the approval 
of a district court or the Secretary of Labor. 
As a result of this new statute, private unapproved settlements of FLSA 
claims would be allowed only as settlements of lawsuits and not as 
settlements of causes of action.  If an employee sues his employer under the 
FLSA, the parties should be allowed to settle their lawsuit without approval 
and with or without prejudice as long as the settlement is entered into 
knowingly and voluntarily and is of a bona fide dispute.  But a private 
settlement obtained outside the adversarial context of a lawsuit should not be 
enforceable unless it is of a bona fide dispute and made with court or DOL 
approval. 
CONCLUSION 
The FLSA is a uniquely protective statute319 and there are some 
convincing arguments for why it should be considered an applicable federal 
statute under Rule 41.320  However, it is clear that applicable federal statutes 
must have an explicit approval requirement to be considered exempt from 
Rule 41’s voluntary dismissal provision.321  Since the FLSA lacks such an 
explicit approval requirement, it cannot be considered an applicable federal 
statute under Rule 41.322  The FLSA should not be amended to include such 
a provision because an approval requirement is neither necessary nor proper 
for FLSA lawsuits.323  Even though the FLSA is not an applicable federal 
statute under Rule 41, it is a highly protective statute and should be treated 
as such.  Thus, the FLSA should adopt the ADEA’s knowing and voluntary 
standard and a bona fide dispute requirement to apply to the dismissal of 
lawsuits.324  Even though FLSA lawsuits should be allowed to be dismissed 
without court or DOL approval, FLSA causes of action should not be.325  
There are too many dangers involved in allowing parties to settle outside the 
adversarial context of a lawsuit.  These dangers dictate that courts or the DOL 
must approve settlements of causes of action and that these settlements must 
be of a bona fide dispute to effectively accomplish the goals of the FLSA.326  
To put these rules into effect, Congress must amend the FLSA.327 
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